ORLANDO, Fla. — Months after a school attack that left 19 students and two teachers dead, mounting pressure about the law enforcement response comes as Uvalde’s top school official is recommending the firing of school district police chief Pete Arredondo.


What You Need To Know

  • On May 24, 19 children and two teachers were killed in a shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas

  • Several videos of the law enforcement response to the school shooting have been released

  •  Uvalde’s top school official is recommending the firing of school district police chief Pete Arredondo after what committee members call “systemic failures and egregious poor decision making"

  • A local expert says one major issue was the amount of waiting members of law enforcement did before acting to take out the shooter

This push comes just days after the release of a state report on the shooting, which highlighted what committee members called “systemic failures and egregious poor decision making.” The report specifically called out law officers response — and school officials who didn’t follow safety plans.

Several videos of the law enforcement response following the shooting have also been released, and the Spectrum News 13 Watchdog team is taking a deeper look at them with a security management expert.

The barrage of gun fire, the panicked officers on scene — all hard to watch, but the video released in conjunction with a state of Texas preliminary report, sheds light on what happened that dark day in May when the 18-year-old shooter walked into Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas.

“The initial response was pretty good for the initial people that responded onto the scene, not knowing what was going on outside," security expert Dave Benson said. "The problem is there was a lot of waiting."

That is problem area No.1 said Benson, who has more than 40 years of security management experience and active shooter training.

Giving his expert opinion on the police response in Uvalde, Benson said inaction was a problem that day.

“Yes, engage, but you have to assess the circumstance," he said. "So it looks like they were also shot at, so they backed up. You need to regroup, report that and go in — in a team of two, three, four.

"Whoever is there to go in and try to neutralize that threat, because if you don’t, we know that typically active assailants are going to keep killing until they are stopped."

But it would take more than an hour before officers breached the classroom where the shooter was and took him down. According to the Texas report, multiple officers called for backup and requested more equipment.

The 77-page interim report slams the law enforcement response, calling it “an overall lackadaisical approach” by the 376 law enforcement officers who responded to the shooting. The report also says that “law enforcement responders failed to adhere to their active shooter training and failed to prioritize saving lives of innocent victims over their own safety.”

The report points out Uvalde school district active shooter plans directs its police chief, Arredondo, to assume command of an active shooter response — while the chief was one of the first on the scene, he claims the role of incident commander was never established, meaning no one took charge.

That is the second standard Benson said was concerning.

“The initial people who are on the scene, someone has to be designated as the incident commander," he said. "(He or she) is going to be in charge until such time as other people arrive on the scene, and decisions need to be made virtually instantly when that happens."

Spectrum News went to Orlando Police Chief Orlando Rolón for a second opinion — whose department was cleared after questions were raised about it’s response to the Pulse Nightclub shooting.

When asked if it is customary for officers to wait until they receive instruction before they go into an active shooter situation, Rolón said they are trained to defer to the agency in charge.

"We never want to second guess any other agency, any other state for that matter, when it comes to the way they do business," he said. "What we do focus on is how we would want our officers to respond here — everyone understands that if you are first, you are the first in.”

While Rolón didn’t directly comment about what happened in Uvalde, he shed some light on the protocol for OPD officers during active shooter situations, and what they learned after Pulse.

“Even when we got there, we knew the situation was bad, but we never imagined that it was as bad as it was until we were able to access the building fully to determine how many victims we had inside," he said.

Rolón said officers have to immediately access during an active shooter situation, so they can run point and work closely with multiple jurisdictions while responding to a threat.

“For the most part, that is one of the great things we have here in Central Florida," he said. "Most of the law enforcement agencies are familiar with the same training curriculum that is offered to the officers."

That is the third area that some security experts say was a big miss in Uvalde — the lack of cross-training.

 “This is a situation where you would need a rapid response group," Benson said. "A rapid response group would mean you might have multiple agencies responding at the same time, but yet you are trained similarly if not identically and you go in together and have a plan of attack."